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COMMENTARY
A Breakthrough with the TPP: The Tobacco Carve-Out
Sergio Puig* and Gregory Shaffert
The United States has made great progress in reducing tobacco consumption
at home while spending taxpayer money to promote its consumption abroad.'
While U.S. tobacco consumption rates haven fallen dramatically since the 1960s,
they are soaring in the developing world.2 Today, about twenty percent of adults
in the world smoke, and more than eighty percent of them live in low- and
middle-income countries.3 As a result, tobacco could kill one billion people this
century, and largely in these lower-income countries.4
Tobacco's global success is partly the result of free-trade agreements that
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the International Economic Law and Policy
Program at James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona.
T Chancellor's Professor of Law and Director of the Center of Globalization, Law, and
Society at University of California, Irvine School of Law.
1 Since the first Surgeon General's Report on tobacco use was published in 1964, adult
smoking rates in the United States have decreased by more than half, from 42.4% in 1965 to
16.8% in 2014. See OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING-50 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 720 (2014); Ahmed Jamal et al., Current Cigarette Smoking Among
Adults-United States, 2005-2014, 64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1233, 1233
(2015).
2 See Tobacco and the Developing World, ACTION ON SMOKING & HEALTH 1 (2015),
http://ash.org.uk/files/documents/ASH_126.pdf; WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO REPORT ON THE
GLOBAL TOBACCO EPIDEMIC, 2015: RAISING TAXES ON TOBACCO 11 (2015),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstreaml1O665/178574/1/9789240694606_eng.pdf (reporting that
over 80% of premature deaths from noncommunicable diseases occur in the developing world,
and that tobacco represents "the largest preventable risk factor" for these diseases). But see Carl
E. Bartecchi et al., The Human Costs of Tobacco Use, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 975, 975 (1994)
(reporting former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop's statement hat "cigarette smoking is the
leading cause of preventable premature death in our society and the most important public health
issue of our time").
3 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 1, at 15. According to the World Health
Organization, member states are grouped into four income groups (low, lower-middle, upper-
middle, and high) based on the World Bank's list of analytical income classification of
economies. See Health Statistics and Information Systems: Definition of Region Groupings,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2016),
http://www.who.int/healtltnfo/global burden disease/definition regions/en.
4 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 1, app.VII (reporting an age-standardized
tobacco smoking rate of 2l.1% in 2013 among persons aged at least fifteen years); Tobacco
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mandate the removal of import taxes and other commercial restrictions on most
goods, including tobacco products.5 Both Republican and Democratic
administrations have supported the tobacco industry in trade deals and awarded
federal subsidies to tobacco growers and exporters for eight decades.6 These
generous subsidies were only ended (at least for now) in 2014.' U.S. policymakers
have long maintained that since cigarettes are legally sold in the United States and
abroad, trade officials should treat the industry no differently in trade agreements.8
A 1990 congressional report issued at the dawn of major trade negotiations noted
the "conflict . .. between U.S. trade goals and health policy objectives," but to no
avail.9
The tobacco 'carve-out' in the recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement (TPP) represents a historic shift.'0 The carve-out permits TPP member
countries to block corporations from using the 'investor-state dispute settlement'
(ISDS) mechanism to receive compensation for commercial damages resulting
5 See, e.g., Robert Stumberg, Safeguards for Tobacco Control: Options for the TPPA, 39
AM. J.L. & MED. 382, 382-83 (2013). But cf Jeffery Drope & Jenina Joy Chavez, Complexities
at the Intersection ofTobacco Control and Trade Liberalization: Evidence from Southeast Asia,
24 TOBACCO CONTROL el28, e129 (2015) (pointing to some complex methodological issues in
studying the effects of trade liberalization and the level of tobacco consumption).
6 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31; Tobacco Control Act, ch. 866,
48 Stat. 1275 (1934) (establishing price support and production adjustment for tobacco); For
recent discussion on their elimination, see Emily McCord, Tobacco Farmers Lose Longtime
Safety Net, NPR (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/10/24/3 57947259/tobacco-farmers-
lose-longtime-safety-net. In fact, since the 1960s countries like Malawi have complained about
the effects of U.S. subsidies in global markets and on local production. See Statement by the
Representative of Malawi Before the Council of Representatives for the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, United States Subsidy on Manufactured Tobacco (Nov. 6, 1967),
https://www.wto.org/gatt docs/English/SULPDF/90800173.pdf.
7 See McCord, supra note 6.
8 See, e.g., Thomas J. Bollyky, The Tobacco Problem in U.S. Trade, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/trade/tobacco-problem-us-trade/p31346. But see Stan
Sesser, Opium War Redux, NEW YORKER, Sept. 13, 1993, at 78, 79 (quoting Dr. James Mason,
Assistant Secretary for Health in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under
President George H.W. Bush, as saying: "Our country has been known for its humanitarian and
health-related projects worldwide. This is a hundred and eighty degrees opposite. We're talking
about millions of lives and that totally outweighs and overwhelms what we've accomplished
in the humanitarian field. It's outrageous for the United States to allow this misery and suffering
to occur").
9 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/NSIAD-90-190, TRADE AND HEALTH ISSUES:
DICHOTOMY BETWEEN U.S. TOBACCO EXPORT POLICY AND ANTISMOKING INITIATIVES 5 (1990),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/149076.pdf.
10 See Jackie Calmes, Trans-Pacific Partnership Is Reached, but Faces Scrutiny in
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from tobacco control measures." For the first time, an international commercial
treaty treats tobacco companies exceptionally for selling-to quote from the World
Health Organization-the "only legally available product that kills up to one half
of its regular users."12
The carve-out comes in the wake of two key trends. On the one hand, tobacco
companies are strategically using international litigation, such as ISDS, to
challenge tobacco control measures around the world, including bans of flavored
cigarettes; marketing and advertising restrictions; labeling requirements of health
risks; import and export taxes; price, import, and export controls; and brand
registration recognition. Philip Morris is implicated in one-third of thirty-nine
international cases tracked by a recent study.'3 On the other hand, in part because
of international cases involving tobacco, litigation has incited growing resistance
to ISDS in the United States itself, a challenge politically advanced by Senator
Elizabeth Warren, among others." ISDS is not the only international dispute-
resolution mechanism, but it raises particular concerns since it is not an interstate
mechanism, but rather directly grants foreign companies legal standing to bring
claims against governments before ad hoc arbitration panels. In ISDS cases, both
the company and the government select one of the arbitrators from among a
specialized bar paid large sums to arbitrate the disputes. The arbitrators' decisions
11 Id. Article 29.5 of the TPP reads:
A Party may elect to deny the benefits of Section B of Chapter 9
(Investment) with respect to claims challenging a tobacco control measure
of the Party. Such a claim shall not be submitted to arbitration under Section
B of Chapter 9 (Investment) if a Party has made such an election. If a Party
has not elected to deny benefits with respect to such claims by the time of
the submission of such a claim to arbitration under Section B of Chapter 9
(Investment), a Party may elect to deny benefits during the proceedings. For
greater certainty, if a Party elects to deny benefits with respect to such
claims, any such claim shall be dismissed.
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 29.5, at 29-9, Feb. 4, 2016,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Exceptions-and-General-Provisions.pdf.
12 Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI): Tobacco Product Regulation, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
(2016), http://www.who.int/tobacco/industry/product regulation/background/en.
13 See Sergio Puig, Tobacco Litigation in International Courts, 57 HARV. INT'L L.J.
(forthcoming 2016) (finding, based on 39 cases brought before international courts and
tribunals, that at least 13 cases (or 34% of the surveyed cases) either directly or indirectly (i.e.,
through an affiliated company) involved Philip Morris International).
14 See Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose,
WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-
settlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/20 15/02/25/ec7705a2-bdle- 1 1e4-b274-
e5209a3bc9a9 story.html (describing ISDS panels as "rigged[] pseudo-courts" that favor
multinational corporations at the expense of sovereign states and their citizens).
329
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are not subject to appeal and national courts recognize their arbitral awards except
on narrow grounds. ISDS claims have proliferated over the past decade, including
against developed countries' regulatory practices, and they have incited increasing
contestation of the legitimacy of the ISDS system."
Current international litigation against Australia's recent tobacco regulation
illustrates these trends.'6 Mobilized primarily by Philip Morris," four countries are
challenging before the World Trade Organization (WTO) an Australian law that
mandates placing on all cigarette packages large graphic images of smoking's
effects.' The companies argue that the law violates their trademark rights, despite
15 See, e.g., David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism, 25
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 757, 758-59 (2000); see also Anthony DePalma, NAFTA 'sPowerful Little
Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11,
2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/1 /business/nafta-s-powerful-little-secret-obscure-
tribunals-settle-disputes-but-go-too-far.html (describing early criticisms of the role of
international tribunals between parties to the North American Free Trade Agreement); Letter
from Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean, Univ. of Cal., Irvine Sch. of Law, et al., to Sen. Mitch
McConnell et al. (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ISDS-
Letter-3. 11.pdf (collecting support from a broad group of law professors against inclusion of
ISDS provisions in the TPP). See generally Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007) (describing various features of the modem system of
investment treaty arbitration).
16 Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) s 20(1), (2) (Austl.).
17 See Myron Leving, Tobacco Industry Uses Trade Pacts To Try To Snuff out Anti-
Smoking Laws, NBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2012, 12:14 AM),
http://openchamel.nbcnews.com/ _news/20 12/11/29/15519194-tobacco-industry-uses-trade-
pacts-to-try-to-snuff-out-anti-smoking-laws. In most trade agreements, including the WTO, any
State party to the treaty may initiate an enforcement action. Governments tend to exercise
restraint in the initiation of proceedings after carefully assessing the balance between the likely
benefits, including market access and the costs of bringing an action. In the Australian case,
British American Tobacco initially convinced Ukraine with no direct interest in the Australian
tobacco market to bring a complaint. (After the 2014 revolution, the new government of
Ukraine changed course and withdrew the case). Philip Morris convinced the Dominican
Republic, which has some general interest in tobacco regulation but no significant amount of
tobacco exports to Australia. Philip Morris is currently paying the legal fees of bringing the
case, which is arguably a standard practice in WTO disputes. See Sergio Puig, The Merging of
International Trade and Investment Law, 33 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 33 & n.115 (2015). For
background on the relation of private companies with governments in the bringing of WTO
cases, see generally GREGORY SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION (2003).
18 The four countries are Cuba, Indonesia, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. See,
e.g., Dispute Settlement, Australia Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical
Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and
Packaging, WORLD TRADE ORG. (May 5, 2014),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu_e/casese/ds435 _e.htm (concerning matters
labeled DS435, DS441, DS458, and DS467). At one point, Ukraine also participated but has
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losing this same issue before Australia's High Court.'9 Simultaneously, Philip
Morris created a subsidiary to sue for damages before an ISDS arbitral panel under
a treaty between Australia and Hong Kong on the grounds that Australia's law
constitutes an illegal 'taking' of its brands.20 Philip Morris recently lost the ISDS
arbitration on jurisdictional grounds-an unsatisfactory outcome that failed to
clarify the proper interaction between investment treaties and tobacco control
efforts. As a result, tobacco companies can still use the threat of arbitration against
countries considering tobacco control measures.2' The WTO case, moreover,
continues.
The industry argues that the TPP carve-out unfairly targets tobacco products,
and it has promised to sink the TPP in the U.S. Congress.22 We assert that the
when she learned that her country was a part of the litigation. See Norman Hermant, Ukraine
Attacks Australia's Plain Packaging Laws, AUSTL. BROADCASTING CORP. (Apr. 17, 2015),
http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2012/s3479769.htm.
19 JT Int'l SA v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43 (Austl.). In the Australian courts, the
plaintiffs argued that the provisions were invalid because they constituted a taking of their
trademarks on " [un]just terms." Id. ¶ 2. The Australian High Court denied their claim, finding
that the Act only controls the way tobacco is marketed. Id. ¶ 44.




see also Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) Arbitration: Philip Morris Asia Limited & the
Commonwealth ofAustralia, PHILIP MORRIS INT'L
http://www.pmi.com/eng/mediacenter/companystatements/Pages/bilateral_investmenttreat
y.aspx (last visited May 16, 2016) (listing Philip Morris's claims against Australia's plain-
packaging rules).
21 The tribunal's detailed reasoning for rejecting jurisdiction over Philip Morris's claims
is not yet available. See Jarrod Hepburn & Luke Eric Peterson, Australia Prevails in Arbitration
with Philip Morris over Tobacco Plain Packaging Dispute, INV. ARB. REP. (Dec. 17, 2015),
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/breaking-australia-prevails-in-arbitration-with-philip-
morris-over-tobacco-plain-packaging-dispute/. Phillip Morris also filed a case against Uruguay
under the Switzerland-Uruguay bilateral investment treaty before the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes regarding legislation requiring all cigarettes manufacturers
to adopt a single presentation on packages. This case remains pending. See Philip Morris Brands




22 See Alex Rogers, Election Politics Might Delay Vote on Pacific Trade Accord, NAT'L
J., Nov. 5, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/1 1/election-politics-might-
delay-vote-on-pacific-trade-accord/454998. The American Chamber of Commerce
representative said: "[S]ingling out tobacco [will] open a Pandora's box as other governments
go after their particular bates noires." Danny Hakim, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Works
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tobacco carve-out is far from unfair. It comes in response to increasing industry
litigation used to chill tobacco regulation abroad. As documented by the Campaign
for Tobacco Free Kids, tobacco companies have threatened international litigation
against several poor countries considering tobacco control measures, all of which
bowed to industry pressure and abandoned the intended legislation.2 3 Moreover,
the carve-out applies only to ISDS, a venue considered more problematic than
other international forums because companies have direct access to arbitral
tribunals and there is no governmental screen between the companies and their
introduction of an international claim. With ISDS there is thus a greater likelihood
of overzealous litigation and private pressure behind the scenes through the threat
of arbitration. Any of the current twelve signatory parties to the TPP can still bring
claims (either before a WTO or a TPP panel) if they believe another governmental
party to the treaty is regulating tobacco products for trade-protectionist reasons
rather than to protect public health.
Unimpressed, advocates long concerned about international commercial deals
and socially excessive litigation initiated by industry criticize the carve-out for
being 'too little, too late.' 24 We affirm, however, that the Obama Administration's
break with the tobacco industry is groundbreaking. With this move, President
Obama risks his legacy pact since some otherwise 'pro-trade' Republican
legislators have threatened to join many Democrats and vote against the TPP
because of the tobacco carve-out.25 In past trade deals, the interests of tobacco
producers were put above those of the public. The TPP carve-out hopefully begins
a new trend to accommodate public health concerns in trade deals. It could help
pave the way toward curtailing expansive intellectual property provisions, and the
prospects of aggressive litigation under them, that empower large pharmaceutical
fight-antismoking-measures.html.
23 Sabrina Tavernise, Tobacco Industry Tactics Limit Poorer Nations' Smoking Laws,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/health/tobacco-industry-
tactics-limit-poorer-nations-smoking-laws.html.
24 See, e.g., Gary Fooks & Anna B. Gilmore, International Trade Law, Plain Packaging
and Tobacco Industry Political Activity: The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 23 TOBACCO CONTROL
el, e5-e6 (2014); Joseph Stiglitz: Under TPP, Polluters Could Sue U.S. for Setting Carbon
Emissions Limits, DEMOCRACY NOw (Oct. 27, 2015),
http://www.democracynow.org/2015/10/27/joseph stiglitz under tpp-polluterscould
(arguing generally against ISDS, in part because of its use to neutralize tobacco control
measures in Uruguay and Australia).
25 See Calmes, supra note 10. According to some sources, Ambassador Michael Froman,
the current U.S. Trade Representative, was an important supporter of the carve-out. See Adam
Behsudi, Will the Trans-Pacific Deal Go up in Tobacco Smoke? The Ire ofMcConnel and Other
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companies against governmental interests and thus compromise public health.26
The TPP could have gone further by exempting tobacco from tariff cuts. We
would support this exemption, especially if coupled with consumption taxes that
would raise revenue and reduce demand, particularly in poor countries like
Vietnam.27 Nonetheless, public health advocates should move beyond the claim
that the TPP is 'too little, too late.'2 8 The TPP tobacco carve-out is an
underappreciated, critical first step that existing and future trade and investment
agreements should also adopt. The United States already has free trade agreements
with many TPP countries, such as Mexico and Canada under the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and these agreements grant ISDS rights to
tobacco companies.29 These ISDS allowances will continue to coexist unless the
agreeing governments amend the relevant provisions or explicitly provide for their
replacement. The United States should turn this TPP carve-out into official U.S.
policy for all trade and investment agreements, including NAFTA. This
breakthrough should be generalized so that trade and investment policy always
complement, rather than subvert, public health goals.
26 See Amy Kapczynski, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Is It Bad for Your Health?, 373
NEW ENG. J. MED. 201 (2015).
27 See Michele Goodwin, Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer, Watch Out, Joe Camel is Back,
Tobacco and the TPP, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 30, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michele-goodwin/watch-out-joe-camel-is-
ba b 7177592.html. There are currently about 5000 tobacco farmers in the United States. See
1 NAT'L AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, 2012 CENSUS OF
AGRICULTURE: UNITED STATES SUMMARY AND STATE DATA 559 tbl.44 (2014),
https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full Report/Volume_1,_Chapter 1 US/us
v1.pdf. Hence, the impact on U.S. jobs would likely be fairly minimal.
28 See, e.g., James Surowiecki, The Corporate-Friendly World ofthe T.P.P., NEW YORKER
(Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-corporate-friendly-world-
of-the-t-p-p (noting that tobacco is "hardly the only industry that raises serious health and
environmental concerns" and questioning why these other industries should be allowed to use
the ISDS process).
29 For discussion of NAFTA, see Daniel Price, Some Observations on Chapter Eleven of
NAFTA, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 421, 426-27 (2000). Unlike the TPP, Chapter 11
of NAFTA allows government policies, including tobacco control measures, to be challenged
through investor-state arbitration. Id.
333
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